How fragile is Nigeria? That is one question Nigerian leaders don’t want to confront. Indeed, it irks them when anyone says that Nigeria is a fragile state. What’s more, some Nigerians, out of sheer romantic or sentimental patriotism hate it when the word “fragility” is used to describe Nigeria. It is unpatriotic, they reckon, for anyone to suggest that Nigeria is a fragile state. But this is not a subjective matter, rather it is an objective reality, based on rigorous assessment of key political, economic and social indicators. Nigeria may choose to be the judge and the jury in its own matter and declare itself strong and stable, the world simply does not see it that way, and the evidence points to a deeply fragile state. In their seminal report on state fragility, published in 2018, Professor Sir Paul Collier, from Oxford University, and Professor Sir Tim Besley, from the London School of Economics, provided a useful analytical framework for understanding state fragility. They came up with what they called the Six Symptoms of State Fragility. They are 1) the prevalence of organised non-state violence; 2) a government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens; 3) a state has a weak capacity for essential functions; 4) the environment for private investment is unattractive; 5) the economy is exposed to shocks with little resilience; and 6) deep divisions in the society. Anyone who examines these symptoms carefully would admit that they perfectly describe Nigeria.
Think about it. Is there anyone who would say there is no prevalence of organised non-state violence in Nigeria when, according to media reports, there were at least 4,326 civilian deaths between January to March in this alone? Or can anyone say that the Nigerian government has the capacity to provide essential amenities for its citizens? Or is the environment attractive private investment when several long-term foreign investors are deserting Nigeria and the country is only attracting volatile portfolio investment? What about cohesion? Is Nigeria united? The truth, except for the self-deluded, is that Nigeria is a deeply fragile state. Indeed, international indexes show it. For instance, in the 2024 Fragile States Index, published by The Fund for Peace, Nigeria was ranked the 15th most fragile state out of 179 countries. Nigeria has also been ranked the 15th most fragile state in the 2026 Fragile States Index, published by the World Population Review. In both indexes, Nigeria is more fragile than other African countries except six: Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali and Libya. This is a deeply depressing picture for Nigeria, Africa’s third largest economy and its most populous and most endowed nation.
Now, how could a country that is so blessed with abundant human and natural resources be the world 15th most fragile state? How could a country whose citizens provide global leadership, running major international organisations, be unable to govern itself well? How could a so-called “Giant of Africa” be more fragile than most African countries? But what happened? Well, while some see Nigeria’s problems as economic in nature, I see them as political and institutional, because Nigeria’s economic and social challenges have their roots in the failure of politics and political institutions. One of the greatest insights came from the famous book Why Nations Fail, written by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, both economics Nobel laureates. In the book, the authors said: “While economic institutions are crucial for determining whether a country is poor or prosperous, it is politics and political institutions that determine what economic institutions a country has.”
For instance, it is politics and the political process that produce leaders that Nigeria has had and thus their economic and social policies. If President Goodluck Jonathan had been re-elected in 2015, he would not have implemented the misguided economic policies and the divisive political and social policies that his successor, President Muhammadu Buhari, implemented. Similar, if President Bola Tinubu loses his re-election bid next year, his successor will almost likely reverse some of his economic policies. Furthermore, it is Nigeria’s political institution, or, if you like, its Constitution that allows someone to become president with only 36 per cent of the popular vote, gained by deploying the wedge issues of ethnicity and religion, and yet control 100 per cent political power under a “winner-takes-all” political process. What about the 64 per cent that did not vote for him? Such a perverse political system causes a government to lack legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens.
Let’s face it, Nigeria’s deeply flawed political and governance structure is the root cause of its fragility, characterised by political instability, economic inequality, ethnic tensions, religious intolerance and social divisions. No country that faces those multiple challenges can be described as anything but fragile because such a country cannot achieve the unity and stability needed to transition from poverty to prosperity, from chaos to order, and from extractive political and economic systems to inclusive ones. Yet, Nigeria is too structurally fragile that it cannot achieve any meaningful progress unless it breaks free from its deeply flawed Constitution, governance structure and democratic practice. For instance, the Nigerian Constitution tells three lies. First, the Constitution starts with the declaration that “We the people … Do hereby make, enact and give to ourselves the following Constitution.” But the people of Nigeria did not enact the Constitution, the military did, and they did not, as with most constitutions, submit it to the people for popular ratification. Unfortunately, thanks to path-dependent institutional development, the civilian leaders have refused to give Nigerians a genuine people’s Constitution. Until Nigeria gets a people’s Constitution, the words “We the people” in the 1999 Constitution are oxymoron.
Then, the Constitution describes Nigeria as a “Federal Republic”. But Nigeria is neither a true federal state nor a true republic. According to the Encyclopaedia Britanica, a true federal system must have three essential features: non-centralisation, local autonomy and elements that promote common nationality. But Nigeria has one of the most centralised political systems in the world, with a constitution that has an “Exclusive Legislative List” that reserves 67 items and “any matter incidental or supplementary to them” to the centre. Most constitutional lawyers say that no other federal constitution has such many items concentrated at the centre. Second, there is no genuine local autonomy in Nigeria, the kind that exists in genuine federal systems where the subnational units can pursue policies that are completely different from those of the centre. But even in the Concurrent Legislative List, which contains matters on which both federal and state governments can legislate, federal laws trump state laws in the event of a clash. That’s not true federalism; it’s a unitary system!
What about the third characteristic: elements that promote common nationality. Tell me, how can the mismanagement of Nigeria’s diversity promote common nationality. President Buhari was accused of a Fulanisation agenda because he put his fellow Fulanis in virtually all critical security positions, completely excluding Igbos. Bola Tinubu ran for president on a Muslim-Muslim ticket, and, in power, he has been accused of a Yorubanisation agenda by putting his fellow Yorubas is virtually all economic, security and justice positions. It’s as if people from other ethnic groups are not smart enough to hold such pivotal roles.
Now, let’s come to republicanism. Is Nigeria a true republic. Of course not. In his book The State We’re In, Will Hutton argues that, in a true republic, “political power and authority are firmly rooted in the people, with the state ruling for the people rather than over them”. But in Nigeria, power flows from the top down, not bottom up. Elections are frequently rigged, and governments never act as the agent of the people. Nigeria is not a true representative democracy because it does not have a social contract. What’s more, Nigeria’s president is one of the most powerful and yet most unaccountable in the world. He rules like an absolute monarch. Truth is, with such deeply flawed political and governance structure, Nigeria risks being trapped in fragility. Only root-and-branch restructuring can help it escape the fragility trap and unlock its potential.
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