In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Holden at Abuja
On Friday, the 17th day of July, 2026
Before their Lordships
Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa
Tijjani Abubakar
Emmanuel Akomaye Agim
Obande Festus Ogbuinya
Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru
Justices, Supreme Court
SC/CV/644/2025
Between
Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission Appellant
And
Godwin Emefiele Respondent
(Lead Judgement delivered by Honourable Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa, JSC)
Facts
The Appellant, a Nigerian law enforcement agency, received “credible intelligence” to the effect that the Respondent, while serving as Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, acquired numerous properties reasonably suspected to have been illicitly acquired. Further to the intelligence report, the Appellant discovered a number of properties and accordingly, commenced a non-conviction based forfeiture proceedings under Section 17 of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006 at the Federal High Court, Lagos. The trial court delivered a ruling granting an interim order of forfeiture of the properties in question listed as Schedule A attached to the affidavit in support of the motion ex-parte, and directed the Appellant to give notice of the interim forfeiture by publication in any of the specified widely circulated national dailies.
Further to the publication, the Respondent filed a motion for stay of proceedings and an affidavit to show cause. A counter- affidavit and further affidavit were filed thereafter. During the proceedings, the Appellant filed a motion on notice praying for a final forfeiture of the properties, and a counter-affidavit to the Respondent’s application to show cause. Upon conclusion of the substantive motion on notice, the trial court delivered its final judgement, making an order for the final forfeiture to the Federal Government of Nigeria, of all the properties contained in Schedule A, which properties are reasonably suspected to have been acquired with proceeds of unlawful activities.
The Respondent, who was dissatisfied with the judgement, appealed to the Court of Appeal, which court, by its majority decision, allowed the appeal in part, set aside the final forfeiture with a directive that the parties be given opportunity to call oral evidence. The court thereby ordered that the case be remitted to the Chief Judge for re-assignment to another Judge of the Federal High Court for a re-hearing. Expectedly, the Appellant appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
Issues for Determination
The Supreme Court adopted the issues formulated by the Appellant in its determination of the appeal:
1. Having regard to the clear provision of Section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006 and the decision of this Honourable Court in Jonathan v FRN (2019) LPELR-46944(SC), whether Their Lordships of the court below were right in holding that the Respondent may be the direct and true beneficiary of the forfeited properties when the Respondent failed to substantiate his claim of legitimate earnings, failed to demonstrate how his legitimate earnings were utilised to purchase those properties, and failed to establish any link between himself and the companies in whose names the properties were purchased, especially when none of those companies challenged the interim forfeiture order.
2. Whether Their Lordships of the court below were right when they relied on the decision of this Honourable Court in Kotoye v Saraki, to hold that constructive or resulting trusts were created in favour of the Respondent in respect of properties reasonably suspected to have been acquired with the proceeds of crime and, in spite of the fact that the Respondent neither pleaded the equitable defence, nor was the issue which was never canvassed at the trial court raised, with the leave of the court below.
3. Whether Their Lordships of the court below were right in directing that the proceedings founded on Section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006 be converted to a plenary trial with the calling of oral evidence by the parties, when there was no conflict to be resolved by oral evidence and in a generis non-criminal based asset forfeiture proceedings, which, by law, is based on affidavit evidence only.
4. Whether Their Lordships of the court below erred in law when they held that the Appellant did not controvert the fact that the Respondent earned such funds as indicated in this affidavit which was supported by the documents attached to the affidavit of the Respondent, as well as replying on the extrajudicial statement of Mr Omeke to hold that Mr Omeke revealed that the Respondent was engaged in bribery and money laundering.
5. Whether Their Lordships of the court below erred in law when they held that the trial court had not adequately evaluated the evidence adduced by the parties before granting the Appellant’s motion on notice for final forfeiture of the properties listed in schedule A, and that the trial court was wrong in holding that the Respondent had not established interest in the forfeited properties.
Arguments
Arguing issue one, the Appellant submitted that contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeal, that the funds used for the purchase of the forfeited properties in Schedule A were proceeds of the legitimate earnings of the Respondent, there is no proof that the funds came from the Respondent. All the payment for the properties was not traced to the Respondent, and there was no evidence of how the Respondent’s alleged earnings were applied to the purchase of the properties held in the names of different companies, which the Respondent denied knowledge of. Counsel submitted that forfeiture proceedings are directed at properties rather than individuals; thus, by Section 17(2) of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006, the onus is on the Respondent to prove his legitimate earnings and demonstrate how the earnings were utilised to acquire the properties, the subject of the forfeiture proceedings.
Per contra, the Respondent submitted that the Appellant having admitted the truth of the depositions in the Respondent’s affidavit to show cause, and having not filed a Cross-Appeal or a Respondent’s Notice regarding the alleged lack of evidence showing that the funds for the purchase of the properties came from the Respondent’s account, it is late in the day for the Appellant to challenge the evidence. Further, that his unchallenged averments are reasonable and believable and the court is obliged to accept same and act on them accordingly.
Regarding issues two and three, the Appellant submitted that the beneficial owners of the properties in question are the persons whose names are on the title deeds, and they are the ones who ought to show cause that the properties were not acquired with the proceeds of crime, not a total stranger who claims that the properties do not belong to the companies. Countering the submissions, the Respondent argued that the findings of the Court of Appeal that there is a constructive trust between the Respondent and his solicitor in respect of the acquisition of the properties listed in Schedule A, is unassailably sound. On issue three, he submitted that the lower court ought not to have remitted the case to the trial court but dismissed same, having found that there is no evidence to justify the order of final forfeiture.
Arguing issue four, the Appellant submitted that there was no evidence that the Respondent’s personal solicitor received any instruction from him to invest monies in the properties ordered to be confiscated, and that the facts alleged by the Respondent failed to answer the question whether the funds used for the purchase of the properties were from illicit engagements. The Respondent on his part, submitted that averments contained in his affidavit to show cause, which were not controverted by the Appellant, were deemed unchallenged.
On issue five, the Appellant argued in support of the evaluation of evidence by the trial court and the conclusion reached. The Respondent, however, submitted that the Court of Appeal was right to have distinguished the present case from the case of JONATHAN v FRN, as the said authority relied on by the trial court differs from this case.
Court’s Judgement and Rationale
Deciding issue one, the Supreme Court quoted extensively the provisions of Section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006, noting that the power to make an Order of forfeiture without conviction is derived thereunder, but subject to the applicability of the provisions of Sections 36(1) and 44(1) & (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The Supreme Court found that the relevant provisions of the Act contain inherent mechanism, for according fair hearing to the respective parties to the suit. The Applicant should, after identifying the properties reasonably suspected to be proceeds of crime, file an ex-parte application for an interim order of forfeiture to preserve the properties from being dissipated. The High Court has a duty to grant the interim order, and direct the Applicant to publish the order notifying anyone who may be affected to appear in court to show cause why the final order of forfeiture should not be granted. The court relied on the decision in 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD. v ABIOLA & SONS LTD. (1995) 3 NWLR (PT. 383) 257, to distinguish between an order of interim injunction and interlocutory injunction and the constitutionality thereof.
In this case, the Respondent pleaded what he alleged to be his earnings, however, no reliable evidence was advanced in the affidavit to show how the alleged earnings were applied to the purchase of the properties in question, held in the names of various companies, which total value exceeds N7,967,369,000, excluding the industrial complex under construction on the 22plots of land in Delta State. These companies were alleged to have been acquired after the Respondent’s Asset Declaration in 2019, where the Respondent declared that he had no savings. Curiously, the companies in whose names the assets were held did not challenge the forfeiture proceedings, thereby subjecting the properties to reasonable suspicion of having been illicitly acquired. The Respondent posited that, he did not instruct his solicitor that the properties be purchased in the names of the companies. The solicitor, however, in Exhibit EFCC 12, stated that he was indeed, instructed by the Respondent to acquire the forfeited properties in the names of the listed companies. Despite this fundamental conflict, there is no evidence to show how monies were given to the Respondent’s solicitor for the purchase of the properties in question. Further, by his Asset Declaration of 2019, the Respondent appeared not to have had the capacity to purchase the properties listed. Under the law, the Respondent has a duty to establish by cogent affidavit evidence that the properties or proceeds, being the subject of the trial court’s interim forfeiture, were acquired with legitimate funds, and not otherwise – JONATHAN v FRN (2019) 20 NWLR (PT. 168) 533. The Supreme Court held that, there is sufficient evidence to justify the findings of the trial court.
On issues two and three, the Supreme Court held that there is no evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the properties in question by the Respondent. There’s neither cogent evidence as to how the purchase was funded, nor an unassailable evidence regarding how the purported trust was given. It is trite law that, for a trust to be validly enforceable, it must involve specific property, reflect the settlor’s intent, and be created for a lawful purpose. Thus, a trust comes into being as a consequence for a manifestation of an intention to create it. The Court of Appeal had relied on the case of KOTOYE v SARAKI (1994) LPELR 1768(SC) to hold that a constructive trust was created in favour of the Respondent, in respect of the forfeited properties. The Supreme Court found the decision erroneous as the referenced case did not make any conclusive pronouncement regarding the issue of constructive trust or resulting trust, let alone declaring same in favour of any of the parties therein. The issue of constructive trust relied on by the Court of Appeal was merely a passing remark, an obiter dictum which did not in anyway result in deciding the live issues in the matter – ORUGBO v UNA (2002) LPELR-2778(SC). The Apex Court expounded further on the issue of whether bribe or property illicitly acquired by an agent is held in trust for the principal, or whether the principal merely has a claim for equitable compensation in a sum equal to the value of the bribe or illicitly acquired property. The court reviewed various jurisprudential antecedents, including the decisions in ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF HONG KONG v RELD (1993) WLR 1142; (1994) ALL ER 1; (1994) 1 AC 324, and came to the conclusion that based on the relevant laws and the doctrine of equity, all the properties which the Respondent (as employee and agent of the Federal Government) erroneously claimed to have accrued to him, must be deemed and treated ad received for the benefit of the principal.
Deciding issue four, the court reviewed Exhibit OL-1, the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria issued by the CBN, which provides for the remuneration of Directors. The Supreme Court found that ironically, the said Exhibit OL-1 does not stipulate the actual remuneration of the Respondent. Thus, the court adjudged the said document as a guideline, irrelevant to the purchase of the properties in question.
Regarding issue five, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the trial court that there was sufficient documentary evidence that could effectively resolve any conflicts inherent in the affidavits of the respective parties, thereby obviating the need to resort to oral evidence to resolve such conflicts. More so, the companies by which the forfeited properties were purchased, neither filed an affidavit to show cause nor denied ownership thereof.
Concluding on the findings above, the Supreme Court resolved all the issues in favour of the Appellant, set aside the majority decision of the Court of Appeal, and restored the judgement of the trial court.
Appeal Allowed.
Representation
Kanu G. Agabi, CON, SAN; Akinyele Delame, SAN; Rotimi Oyedepo Ise Oluwa, SAN; Uchenna Njoku, SAN; with others for the Appellant.
Olalekan Ojo, SAN; A. Labi-Lawal, SAN with others for the Respondent.
Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)