Editorial: Somalia's Security Dilemma: Can a Nation Dependent on Foreign Forces Defend Itself?

For years, international partners have helped Somalia fight Al-Shabaab, train troops and strengthen its security institutions. Yet this support has also exposed a serious weakness: the country's security remains deeply dependent on external funding, equipment, training and political commitments. The withdrawal of Ugandan forces from several forward operating bases in Lower Shabelle has brought this challenge into sharper focus. Somali forces are expected to assume greater responsibility, but concerns remain about whether they have the personnel, equipment, experience and financial resources to do so effectively. A withdrawal by foreign troops does not automatically mean that national forces are ready to replace them. One of the most troubling problems is the financial condition of the Somali military. Government soldiers are reportedly paid between $100 - $200 a month, and salaries have not always been delivered regularly. Such conditions undermine morale and make it difficult to retain experienced personnel. They also create vulnerabilities that armed groups and external actors can exploit. A soldier who is poorly paid, inadequately equipped and uncertain about receiving his next salary cannot be expected to carry the full burden of national security. This weakness has encouraged reliance on foreign-backed forces. The United States has supported the Danab special forces, while Türkiye has played a significant role in training and developing Somali troops. The United Arab Emirates has also supported security units, particularly in regional administrations. Other countries, including Eritrea and Egypt, have contributed to training efforts. Alongside these forces, local community militias known as Macawisley have played an important role in fighting Al-Shabaab. Although international assistance has helped strengthen parts of Somalia's security apparatus, it has also produced a fragmented system. Different units may depend on different foreign sponsors, funding arrangements and political relationships. This raises questions about national command, accountability and the long-term sustainability of the armed forces. The United Arab Emirates has become particularly important in this debate. Its support for security forces and involvement in port development have given it considerable influence in parts of Somalia. However, relations between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi have deteriorated amid wider disagreements over sovereignty and regional political arrangements. In January 2026, Somalia's Federal Government announced the termination of all agreements with the UAE, covering port operations, government institutions, and security and defense cooperation. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the decision was intended to protect Somalia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. It affects arrangements involving the ports of Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo, as well as cooperation with federal institutions and member states. The government accused the UAE of actions it considers hostile and destabilizing, arguing that they violate international principles of sovereignty and non-interference. However, announcing the termination of agreements does not guarantee that the decision can be implemented uniformly. Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland rejected Mogadishu's move, while DP World said operations at Berbera would continue under existing arrangements. These disagreements expose a deeper problem: the federal government does not always exercise effective authority over agreements and security arrangements involving regional administrations. Somalia's sovereignty is therefore challenged not only by external influence but also by internal political divisions. Turkey's role presents another important dimension. Ankara has invested heavily in military training and maintains a significant strategic presence in Somalia. Its cooperation extends beyond security to areas such as energy exploration and other economic interests. This partnership offers opportunities to strengthen national institutions, but it also demonstrates how Somalia's security and development remain connected to the priorities of foreign partners. The United States' support for Danab is similarly important. Any reduction in financial or logistical assistance could affect the operational capacity of one of Somalia's most capable units. Questions about the future of foreign support at facilities such as Baledogle, and the sustainability of international logistical assistance, underline the risks of building military capabilities that cannot be maintained independently. The broader threat posed by Al-Shabaab makes these weaknesses especially dangerous. Military operations require more than trained soldiers. They depend on reliable intelligence, effective leadership, coordinated command, adequate logistics and sustained financing. Without these foundations, territorial gains may be temporary and vulnerable to reversal. Somalia must therefore reconsider the way it approaches national security. Foreign assistance remains necessary, but it should strengthen a unified national army rather than create competing structures dependent on separate sponsors. The government must prioritice regular salaries, transparent defense spending, professional training and a clear chain of command. Federal and regional authorities must also reach agreements that place national security interests above political rivalries. Ultimately, sovereignty is not secured through declarations alone. It requires institutions capable of exercising authority, defending territory and protecting citizens without depending indefinitely on foreign governments. Somalia's international partners can help build that capacity, but they cannot substitute for it. The country's long-term stability will depend on whether its leaders can turn fragmented, externally supported forces into a disciplined, nationally accountable military.