In the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Holden at Abuja
On Friday, the 12th day of December, 2025
Before their Lordships
Muhammad Lawal Garba
Tijjani Abubakar
Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme
Haruna Simon Tsammani
Jamilu Yammama Tukur
Justices, Supreme Court
SC/CR/560/2021
Between
Olumide Famotua Appellant
And
The State Respondent
(Lead Judgement delivered by Honourable Tijjani Abubakar, JSC)
Facts
The Appellant was arraigned on a four-count Information. He was charged with the attempted murder of one Akinrisola Cyril, and with robbing him of N4,000.00 and two mobile phones while armed with a gun, on 11th September, 2016. He was further charged with robbing one Mrs Akintola Modupeola while armed with a gun on 14th October, 2016, and with murdering her in the course of that robbery. Upon his arraignment at the High Court of Ondo State, he pleaded not guilty to all counts. At the end of the trial, the court convicted the Appellant for attempted murder, armed robbery, and murder. He was accordingly sentenced to twenty-year imprisonment for attempted murder, and to death for armed robbery.
The Appellant unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, Akure, which court affirmed the judgement of the trial court. Further dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue for Determination
The Supreme Court adopted the sole issue formulated by the Appellant, to wit:
Whether the trial court and the lower court properly evaluated the evidence adduced at the trial court, and came to the conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of the allegations in counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Information?
Arguments
On the sole issue, the Appellant submitted with respect to the count relating to Mrs Akintola, that there was no eyewitness account of what transpired at the scene; that no witness was called from among those who conveyed the victim to the Police clinic; and that no witness saw the Appellant or his belongings at the scene. He contended that no witness testified that the attackers acted to rob the deceased of her mobile phone and handbag, and that it defied common sense for a robber to expend about 17 bullets on one woman merely to obtain a mobile phone. He submitted further that the Respondent’s account of how he came into possession of the Itel phone, which he sold to PW3, was uncontradicted, so the trial court could not speculate as to how he came by it; and that the evidence on the killing and the whereabouts of the deceased’s phone and handbag was too hazy and incoherent, to ground a conviction for murder and armed robbery. He added that the prosecution proved only the first ingredient of murder through PW1, but not the second and third, and that the Appellant was not arrested at the scene.
On attempted murder, the Appellant submitted that the only identification evidence linking the Appellant to the robbery of PW4 on 11th September 2016, was PW4’s own evidence, given at about 5:45 a.m. in the dark on an untarred road with no streetlight, where features such as tribal marks could barely be observed. No other witness saw the incident. He conceded that the evidence of PW4 proved that there was an armed robbery, but denied that it linked the Appellant to it. The Appellant contended that the entire judgement of the trial court was driven by sentiment, since a senior officer of the State Ministry of Justice was a victim and human life was lost in the other incident. He argued that the trial Judge did not conceal his bias, and discarded the Appellant’s evidence as lies without adequate consideration, contrary to the decision in AKINDIPE v THE STATE (2016) 15 NWLR (PT. 1536) 470, to the effect that a defence raised by an accused, however unfounded it may appear, ought to be adequately considered. Relying also on OGUNDIYAN v THE STATE (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 181) 519, Counsel urged the Supreme Court to set aside the concurrent findings as perverse, unsupportable by evidence, and occasioning a manifest miscarriage of justice.
The Respondent argued contrariwise, faulting the contention of the Appellant that the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt, stating that the contention was evidentially false, unsustainable, and unsupported by credible and legally founded argument. He submitted that this is a case of concurrent findings of fact, which the Supreme Court rarely disturbs unless the findings are unsupported by evidence, perverse, occasion a miscarriage of justice, or the lower court overlooked a principle of law or procedure, which the Appellant failed to establish. On attempted murder, the Respondent set out the three statutory elements, which are the intention to kill, the execution of that intention by an overt act, and an intervening act from fulfilling it. Counsel thereafter submitted that PW4 was unequivocal in his evidence that the Appellant robbed him, pointed a gun at him and shot him at close range; which evidence was itself sufficient proof, an accused being presumed to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate acts. Further, that where a dangerous weapon is used to attack a person, death is inferred as the intended probable consequence. He relied on OKORO v THE STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 181; ONYEGBU v THE STATE (1998) 1 ACLR 386 and AFOLALU v THE STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (PT. 1220) 584 for the settled principle that the credible evidence of a single witness, is sufficient to justify a conviction.
On armed robbery, the Respondent outlined the three elements from BOZIN v THE STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 8) 465, and submitted that the evidence of PW1 to PW5, together with exhibits 1 to 9 were sacrosanct, and that the guilt of an accused may be proved by confessional statement, circumstantial evidence, or direct evidence of an eyewitness. He submitted that there was strong and cogent circumstantial evidence, that the Appellant committed armed robbery twice: on the first two elements, that the evidence of PW1 to PW5, exhibits 7 to 9 and the Appellant’s extrajudicial statements confirmed that the robberies occurred, a point the Appellant did not contest; and on the third element, that PW4 confirmed the Appellant’s participation in the armed robbery of 11th September, 2016, while the trial court rightly found that circumstantial evidence, corroborated by the Appellant’s extrajudicial statements, irresistibly linked him to the armed robbery and killing of Mrs Akintola. The Respondent urged the court to discountenance the submissions of the Appellant on poor lighting and the short duration of the encounter, since PW4’s identification of the Appellant under cross-examination sufficed to link him with the offence.
Court’s Judgement and Rationale
Deciding the case, the Supreme Court held that by Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that this burden remains on the prosecution throughout. Relying on NWATUROUCHA v THE STATE (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1242) 170 AT 193, the Court held that “proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence… consistent with a high degree of probability”, and that where all the essential ingredients of an offence are proved, proof beyond reasonable doubt should not be stretched beyond limit. On armed robbery, the Court, relying on MOHAMMED v STATE (2020) LPELR-52451(SC) held that the prosecution must prove: (a) that there was a robbery; (b) that the Appellant participated in the robbery; (c) that during the robbery, the Appellant was armed with offensive weapon or was in company of a person who was so armed”.
On the evidence of PW4, the court held that the testimony of PW4 at the trial court was clear and unambiguous, and that the trial Judge, having the opportunity of listening to the testimony and observing the demeanour of the witness, rightly believed him. Their Lordships held that “eyewitness evidence is always reliable evidence, provided the witness is telling the truth. Such evidence is on what the witness saw, it is almost impossible to dislodge such evidence”, and that “the evidence of a victim qualifies as that of an eye witness”. It held further, citing IGBO v STATE (1975) 9 NSCC 418 and ABOGEDE v STATE (1996) 5 NWLR (PT. 449) 279, that it is not the number of witnesses that matters, and that “a sole witness whose evidence meets the standard of proof as required by law is sufficient to ground conviction, if the evidence given by the witness is credible and reliable”.
On the killing of Mrs Modupeola Akintola, the Supreme Court adopted the findings of the trial court, that the only evidence that linked the Appellant with the robbery of the deceased was that the Itel cell phone of the deceased was traced to the Appellant, and endorsed the decision of the Court of Appeal that that singular act of being in possession of the Itel cell phone soon after the robbery and killing, the Appellant was rightly held as the robber and killer, invoking Section 167(a) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
Deciding the issue of identification of the culprit, the court held that “identification parade becomes necessary only where the identity of the Defendant is in doubt, or during the trial, some doubt is created around the identity of the Defendant”. And, that it will not be necessary where “there is a clear and uncontradicted eye witness account and identification of the person who allegedly committed the crime”, where “the victim knew the accused previously”, where “the Defendant is linked to the offences by cogent and compelling evidence”, or where the accused “in his confessional statement identified himself with the crime.” It would be necessary only where the victim did not know the accused before and his first acquaintance with him was during the commission of the offence, was confronted for a very short time, or lacked the opportunity of observing the features of the accused. Applying these principles, the court held that “identification parade will not serve any useful purpose, since PW4 identified the Appellant with certainty”.
On the scope of its appellate power over concurrent findings, the Supreme Court held, citing DARE v FAGBEMI (2009) 14 NWLR (PT. 1160) 177 that it “is stripped of the power to interfere with concurrent findings of facts, except where they are shown to be perverse or contrary to law”. From the totality of the evidence, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the Appellant was properly connected to the crime with which he was charged, and had not made a case deserving of interference. The sole issue was resolved against the Appellant, and the appeal was found to be unmeritorious.
Appeal Dismissed.
Representation
Dr Nnaemeka Otagburuagu with A.G. Ajeka and F.I. Evans for the Appellant.
Adewale Bamisile (Asst. Director, Public Prosecution, Ondo State MOJ) for the Respondent.
Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited, Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR)(An affiliate of Babalakin & Co.)