President Bola Tinubu’s decision to expand the Nigerian Army from eight to 12 divisions marks one of the boldest restructurings of the military in recent years, aimed at decentralising command, strengthening security and reducing response time to emerging threats. But as the new formations take shape, questions around manpower, resources, logistics and, particularly, the geographical contiguity of the states under each command are emerging, raising important questions about how effectively the ambitious reform can deliver on its promises. Chiemelie Ezeobi reports
In sweeping reforms and restructuring that will decentralise Nigerian Army commands, tighten border security, and cut down the time it takes soldiers to reach an emergency, President Bola Tinubu recently approved the expansion of the force from eight divisions to twelve.
With the sweeping restructuring, four new divisional headquarters will rise in Makurdi as 5 Division; Ilorin as 9 Division; Jalingo as 10 Division; and Benin City as 83 Division, joining the existing commands in Kaduna, Ibadan, Jos, Port Harcourt, Maiduguri, Sokoto, Lagos and Enugu.
The announcement came via a State House statement from Bayo Onanuga, Special Adviser to the President on Information and Strategy, who described the move as a “landmark” step in reshaping the country’s security architecture.
Holistic Reforms
Alongside the divisional expansion, President Tinubu approved the recruitment of 28,000 additional personnel, continuing a pattern of investment that has included new military hardware and welfare improvements for troops.
The recruitment of 28,000 additional personnel is meant to give these new commands the manpower to actually function, rather than existing as headquarters on paper alone.
According to the president, implementation will roll out in two phases with the first covering the 5, 9 and 10 Divisions and a reorganisation of existing formations, is billed for completion by September 2026. The second, which stands up the 83 Division in Benin City, is expected by December 2026.
What’s Expected
Undoubtedly, the presidency has laid out ambitious goals for the restructuring with the expectation of better protection for critical national infrastructure like pipelines, power installations, and transport corridors, alongside sharper counter-insurgency and internal security operations.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the new divisions is the promise of speed and faster military response to emerging threats nationwide. Because for communities in the Middle Belt battling farmer-herder clashes, or in the South-South facing pipeline vandalism and kidnapping, a division headquarters located closer to home is meant to translate into troops arriving in hours rather than days.
Breaking Down the New Map
Under the new structure, Nigeria’s 36 states are distributed across twelve commands: 1 Division in Kaduna, which overseas Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa States; 2 Division in Ibadan, which covers Oyo, Osun, Ekiti, and Ondo States; 3 Division in Jos, which superintends Plateau, Bauchi and Gombe States.
Others include the 5 Division in Makurdi, which covers Benue, Nasarawa and Kogi States; 6 Division in Port Harcourt, which commands Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Cross River States; 7 Division in Maiduguri, with Borno and Yobe States; 8 Division in Sokoto, which covers Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara States; 9 Division in Ilorin, which covers Kwara and Niger States.
For 10 Division in Jalingo, it covers Taraba and Adamawa States; 81 Division in Lagos covers Lagos, and Ogun States; 82 Division in Enugu, covers Enugu, Anambra, Abia, Ebonyi and Imo States; while 83 Division in Benin City oversees Edo, Delta and Bayelsa States.
The four newcomers — Makurdi, Ilorin, Jalingo and Benin City, effectively split the old Middle Belt and South-South commands into finer-grained zones, each theoretically closer to the communities it protects.
Hitting the Ground Running
Hitting the ground running after the announcement, the The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Waidi Shaibu, has already appointed pioneer General Officers Commanding (GOCs), conducted initial on-site needs assessments, launched a massive 28,000-personnel recruitment drive, and completed advanced combat training for troops being deployed to these new formations.
For the leadership appointments, Major General Moses Gara was named GOC of the 5 Division (Makurdi); Major General Yakubu Yahaya took command of the 9 Division (Ilorin); and Major General Chinedu Ralph Nnebeife was appointed as the pioneer GOC of the 10 Division (Jalingo), while that of Benin City will come with the second phase of the implementation.
In terms of the promised welfare, the presidency last week announced a massive salary increment ranging from 30 per cent to 80 per cent for the Nigerian Armed Forces, which will take full effect on September 1, 2026.
This pay review directly benefits roughly 250,000 personnel across the Army, Navy, and Air Force, raising the military’s annual personnel wage bill from ₦660 billion to ₦924 billion.
While the junior ranks and non-commissioned officers, from Private up to Staff Sergeant will expect 80 per cent increase, middle-level officers and senior non-commissioned officers, from Warrant Officer up to Colonel will get 50 per cent increase; and senior military leadership, including Brigadier Generals, Major Generals, Lieutenant Generals and Generals will take 30 per cent increase.
The Contiguity Question
But a closer look at the map raises a question the Presidency’s statement doesn’t address: does every state assigned to a division actually sit closest to that division’s headquarters?
Take Kogi for instance. It has been placed under the 5 Division, headquartered in Makurdi, alongside Benue and Nasarawa. On paper, Kogi does share borders with both. In practice, however, Lokoja, which is Kogi’s capital, sits much closer to Ilorin, headquarters of the neighbouring 9 Division, and is arguably nearer to Abuja itself than to Makurdi.
The road from Lokoja to Makurdi is longer and less direct than the route to Ilorin. For a state that has seen its share of banditry and kidnapping along its highways, that extra distance matters when minutes count.
Kogi isn’t alone. In the 9 Division, Niger State, which boasts of Nigeria’s largest by land area, is paired with Kwara under Ilorin’s command. But Niger’s far north, around Kontagora and the Kainji axis, is remote from Ilorin and sits arguably closer to Kebbi or Kaduna. A single headquarters simply cannot be equally close to both ends of a state that size.
Further South, the 83 Division in Benin City covers Edo, Delta and Bayelsa, but Edo and Bayelsa don’t actually touch each other; they’re joined only through Delta.
Bayelsa’s creek-heavy terrain means the road route from Benin City is long and indirect, while Yenagoa is far better connected to Port Harcourt, home of the neighbouring 6 Division. A similar, if smaller, strain shows up in Division 6 itself: Cross River is technically linked to Rivers through Akwa Ibom, but Calabar to Port Harcourt remains a five-to-six-hour drive.
By contrast, divisions like 1 (Kaduna), 8 (Sokoto), 7 (Maiduguri) and 81 (Lagos) show tight, genuinely contiguous clusters where the headquarters sits close to every assigned state, a template the newer divisions could still be adjusted to match before the September and December rollout deadlines.
Speaking on anonymity, a concerned stakeholder noted that divisional headquarters should sit within a cluster of states that are not just administratively grouped, but geographically and logistically close to one another. Where that isn’t the case, as with Kogi, Niger and Bayelsa, the very speed of response the reform promises could be the first casualty.
An Unrealistic Creation?
For so many others, the question even goes beyond contiguity to the reality of creating new divisions with nothing on ground to support that.
In this line of thought is Group Captain Sadeeq Shehu (rtd), a former Airforce Spokesman, who described it as unrealistic and impossible.
In an interview aired on Arise News, he said: “With all due respect. The President cannot just throw numbers, it is unprofessional. How did you come about 4 Divisions? Creating 2 Army Divisions in 2-5 months is unrealistic, impossible. It’s not like putting a sign board on a building and it becomes an international airport.
“You need 15-20,000 men in one. Is it the 28,000 new people that want to man the 4 divisions? Fix the existing gaps first, before talking of another division. If this a political decision, it won’t help the military and the country.”
Pending Reorganisation of Existing Divisions
Given some of the contrary voices over the new divisions, a senior official in the Defence Headquarters, who spoke on strict condition of anonymity told THISDAY that although there will soon be reorganisation of the existing divisions, the new divisions are very much continguous with many things in common.
He said: “You forgot Kogi was carved out of Benue State. They are very much contiguous with many things in common. Again in the press statement there is mention of reorganisation of existing divisions.
“Previously 2 Division in Ibadan conducts operations up to Niger State before Operation Savannah Shield was created. I think the new divisions will indeed decentralise and improve operational efficiency.”
Recommendation/ Caution
For former Chief of Defence Staff, General Lucky Irabor (Rtd.), the expansion was the “right step in the right direction” and a solid foundation for a balanced security architecture.
However, he cautioned that the expansion carries significant resource implications and urged the government to first ensure that the existing eight divisions are adequately staffed, equipped and supported with logistics.
Irabor stressed that troop numbers alone cannot guarantee operational effectiveness, noting the need for modern combat enablers, including advanced surveillance and communication systems, protective equipment and night-fighting capabilities.
He also recommended that similar structural and equipment upgrades be extended to the Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force to create a comprehensive national security architecture.
He further called for the urgent development of Nigeria’s domestic military-industrial complex to reduce dependence on foreign sources for strategic defence hardware.
Given that more than three-quarters of the defence budget is currently spent on personnel costs, he said capital funding must be significantly increased to ensure the 28,000 newly recruited personnel are properly armed, equipped and accommodated.
While the expansion represents more than a change in the army’s command map, its success will ultimately depend on whether the new divisions can be matched with adequate manpower, equipment, infrastructure and logistics, while the geographical concerns are carefully addressed.
As implementation proceeds, the balance between bold restructuring and operational reality will determine whether the reform delivers the faster, more responsive Army it promises.