Ibrahim Sambo

Despite sustained claims by the administration of Bola Tinubu that the military is being better equipped and funded, Nigeria’s armed forces continue to face persistent setbacks against insurgents, bandits, and other non-state actors.

The contradiction between increased resourcing vis-a-vis limited battlefield successes has therefore raised deeper questions about the structural and strategic deficiencies within the country’s security architecture, especially in the military, or to stretch it even further, the loss of the will to fight. The question is why? Why is the military not fighting? Why are they maintaining a defensive posture when they should be on the offensive? Why the 

Indeed, what is increasingly evident is that things have gone from bad to worse. The conflict is no longer geographically contained, like what it was over a decade ago when insurgency was just taking its roots. Today, the armed groups that once operated largely in the North-east have spread across the North-west, penetrated the North-central, and are now exerting pressure toward parts of the southern flank of Nigeria.

From Borno State and Zamfara State to Niger State and Kwara State, from Kogi to Ondo to Oyo, there is a growing sense that criminal networks are linking up, exploiting ungoverned spaces, and creating overlapping theatres of operation. So, is the Nigerian military failing or is there something Nigerians do not know?

Besides, there are concerns that there is a pattern that suggests the military is often reacting to attacks rather than pre-empting them. Armed groups appear to retain the initiative, usually choosing when and where to strike, frequently targeting isolated formations and vulnerable communities. This reactive posture points to possible intelligence gaps, poor surveillance capabilities, and limited coordination among security agencies or even sabotage.

This writer is not a security expert, but it is common knowledge that in asymmetric warfare, the advantage lies with the side that dictates tempo. In Nigeria’s case, that advantage appears to rest with criminal elements.

Closely tied to this is the issue of operational doctrine. Counterinsurgency warfare demands aggressive, intelligence-led operations that disrupt enemy logistics, leadership structures, and supply chains. However, Nigeria’s military operations often appear conventional, focused on holding territory rather than dismantling networks. This has allowed insurgents to retreat, regroup, and launch repeated attacks, creating the impression of a war without decisive momentum.

Just take a look at the calibre of casualties of insurgency in recent years. The list is becoming almost endless. Even in conventional war situations, top military officers rarely get targeted and killed like mere foot soldiers. But in Nigeria, we have witnessed the killing of several very senior military officers, underscoring the risks faced even at the highest levels of command.

Among them are Brig. Gen. Dzarma Zirkusu (2021); Brig. Gen. Oseni Braimah (2026) Col. Dahiru Bako (2020); Lt Col. Ibrahim Sakaba (2018); Lt. Col. Umar Farouq (2026); Lt. Col. S.I Iliyasu (2026); Brig. Gen. Musa Uba (2025); Col. Aliyu Paiko (2025); Lt. Col. Z. Manu (2020); Lt. Col. O. Umusu (2016); Lt. Col. B.U Umar (2016); Lt. Col. Abu Ali (2016), among several others that barely make it to the news. This is unacceptable!

These losses are not merely tactical; they point to deeper vulnerabilities in intelligence, planning, and force protection. Even more concerning is the perception that such high-profile killings have not consistently been followed by overwhelming retaliation capable of restoring deterrence to the criminals. The Nigerian military must show superiority over these renegades.

Although funding is often cited as a major constraint, the Nigerian case seems more complex. A significant portion of security financing is opaque, routed through off-budget channels for what is usually described as security reasons. Beyond appropriations by the National Assembly, the military reportedly receives additional support from state governments and even local government authorities. So, why are there no commensurate results? If anything, the military must fight to justify these expenditures.

The expansion of terrorist and bandit networks into new regions in the country carries profound implications. First, it raises the risk of a nationwide security crisis, where no region can be considered fully insulated. It threatens critical economic corridors, including agricultural belts. Armed groups are exploiting local grievances and identity fault lines. Also, the southward push of these groups introduces new security dynamics in regions previously considered relatively stable.

Ultimately, the persistence and expansion of insecurity despite claims of increased spending suggest that Nigeria’s challenge goes beyond funding. Why is the average insurgent seemingly more motivated and more brutal than the average Nigerian soldier?

In fact, there have been several instances where communities complained of withdrawal of military presence minutes or hours before attacks by terrorists. None of the reports into these investigations have ever been made public (that is if any probe was ever carried out.) Again, this must change!

Funding, while important, is only one piece of a larger puzzle that includes doctrine, intelligence, morale, a motivation to get the job done and leadership. Until these structural issues are addressed in a coordinated manner, the gap between resources committed and results achieved is likely to widen. The Nigerian government must carry out a surgical assessment of its current military. Why is the military failing to go head-to-head with this rag-tag army of hardened criminals? Do they have to be on the defensive most times?

So, beyond whether the military has enough resources, what has become obvious in recent years is that Nigeria’s inability to end insecurity goes beyond military spending. The government must find out why the military appears not to be fighting or fighting half-heartedly.

To buttress how military funding has increased, a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) a few days ago put the surge in expenditure in 2025 at 55 per cent, jumping from roughly $1.35 billion in 2024 to $2.1 billion last year.

In the same vein, the report placed Nigeria among the fastest-growing military spenders globally in 2025, highlighting how internal security pressures are reshaping fiscal priorities in sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria only came behind South Africa on the African continent, the report said.

Again, there seems to be a disconnect between the top echelon of the military and the foot soldiers. Arguing for improved welfare earlier this week, Brig. General S.K. Usman (rtd), speaking on Arise Television, raised concerns over the feeding allowance for Nigerian soldiers. He maintained that the current amount does not match the cost of living.

“How do you expect someone to feed on N3,000 per day in the prevailing circumstance? A  loaf of bread that you used to buy for N500, now you get as much as 1,500 or more,” he maintained. Therein lies the contradiction! If funding has increased, why has the welfare of the rank and file not improved?