The approval of state policing is a significant milestone
The much-discussed establishment of State Police Services has finally reached a defining moment in the long-running debate over the restructuring of Nigeria’s security architecture. Following the concurrence of all the 36 State Houses of Assembly with the Constitution (Sixth Alteration) Bill, 2026, and the transmission to President Bola Tinubu for assent, the country is approaching a significant constitutional transition. However, what remains is more demanding than securing a presidential endorsement. It is the challenge of translating an ambitious restructuring of policing into an effective, accountable, and professionally managed institution.
The unanimous approval by all the 36 states is significant. Ordinarily, section 9(2) of the 1999 Constitution requires the endorsement of at least two-thirds of the State Houses of Assembly. The approval by all the states against the required 24 brings every federating unit on board. Meanwhile, the National Assembly had earlier approved the amendment, with the Senate acting on June 24 and the House of Representatives on July 23. This is a milestone in a debate that has persisted for decades. While successive governments, constitutional conferences, political parties, civil society and security experts have at different times broached the idea, Nigeria has remained with a predominantly centralised police institution.
The case for decentralisation is easy to understand. Banditry, kidnapping, terrorism, communal violence, farmer-herder conflicts and attacks on rural communities have exposed the limits of a centrally administered force covering 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. That force is stretched by vast geographical coverage, personnel constraints and logistical challenges, with deployment and intelligence decisions heavily shaped by a central command. The argument has always been that a police institution closer to the communities it serves could improve intelligence gathering, strengthen preventive policing and reduce response times.
However, proximity does not guarantee professionalism, efficiency or respect for fundamental rights, and decentralisation does not automatically produce better policing. Besides, experience in recent years shows that concentrating coercive powers in political hands without effective institutional restraints can also have serious consequences. This is particularly so in an environment where political competition is intense, electoral disputes are confrontational, and allegations of politically motivated arrests, intimidation and selective enforcement feature prominently in public discourse.
Therefore, the fear that governors could deploy State Police against opponents, critics, opposition parties, journalists and civil society organisationsis a legitimate concern that deserves more than political assurances. Significantly, the amendment recognises these dangers. It creates a dual arrangement of a Federal Police Service and State Police Services, with states establishing theirs through legislation enacted by their Houses of Assembly. Governors may issue lawful written directions of general policy on public safety and order to their Commissioners of Police, but cannot direct officers to arrest, detain, investigate or deploy force against any named individual, political party, association or group except in accordance with the law. The bill also bars the use of State Police to suppress lawful political activities, violate human rights, discriminate, or enforce the law for partisan, ethnic, religious, sectional or personal purposes.
It must be noted though that these prohibitions are meaningful only when violations attract timely investigation, prosecution and sanctions.
The Independent State Police Service Commissions will oversee recruitment, appointments, promotions, transfers, dismissals, discipline, and complaints. Their direct funding is significant, because an oversight body dependent on the goodwill of the governor it scrutinises may struggle to act impartially. A governor will appoint a state Commissioner of Police on the recommendation of the National Police Council, subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly. Removal requires stated cause, a fair hearing, a recommendation by the Council and approval by two-thirds of the Assembly. These safeguards aim to prevent arbitrary dismissals, though their value depends on the independence and integrity of the institutions involved.
Equally important is the distinction between federal and state responsibilities. The Federal Police Service will retain enforcement of federal laws, protection of federal institutions and assets, and national security matters, including terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime, arms trafficking and border security. The Police Service in each of the 36 states will enforce their laws, maintain public safety and order, prevent and detect offences, and protect lives and property. These clear boundaries are fundamental to avoiding rivalry, operational paralysis, and conflict.
The amendment also allows temporary federal intervention where a state police institution cannot maintain order or is implicated in serious abuses. Grounds include an actual or imminent breakdown of public order, serious incapacity, systematic human rights violations, partisan or electoral intimidation, ethnic or religious persecution, and threats to national security. Intervention must be necessary, proportionate, and limited in territory, function, and duration. The President must authorise it in writing, stating grounds, scope and duration; relevant authorities must be notified within 48 hours; extension beyond the period set by an Act of the National Assembly requires Senate approval; and the courts retain jurisdiction to review it.
Ultimately, success of the whole idea will be measured not by the number of institutions established or equipment procured, but by the safety of communities, the protection of citizens’ rights, the professionalism of officers and the confidence Nigerians have in law enforcement. The objective cannot merely be to transfer policing authority from Abuja to 36 state capitals. It must be to build a system in which authority carries responsibility, autonomy is balanced by accountability, and security institutions remain servants of the Constitution rather than instruments of political power.

