Nigeria may have found a compelling reason to reconsider its centralised policing system, but it must not allow the desperation for security to push the country into another experiment with power without adequate safeguards. The argument for state police is understandable. Kidnapping, banditry, communal violence and other crimes have exposed serious weaknesses in the country’s security arrangements. Yet, before governors are given greater control over policing, Nigerians must ask a question that goes beyond the fight against crime: who will protect citizens when those entrusted with protecting them become interested in the outcome of an election?
The debate is no longer theoretical. On October 23, 2026, the Presidency announced that the proposed constitutional amendment establishing a dual policing system had secured the required threshold of approval from state assemblies. The announcement followed the National Assembly’s passage of the amendment. The next steps include presidential assent and the completion of the necessary legislative and institutional arrangements before state police can become operational. This is a significant development in Nigeria’s federal system. But the fact that a constitutional amendment has received the required legislative support does not mean that every question surrounding its implementation has been answered.
The case for state police is straightforward. Nigeria has 36 states and 774 local government areas, with security challenges that differ considerably from one community to another. The problems confronting rural communities in parts of the North-West are not identical to the security concerns of oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta, the commercial centres of Lagos or the communities affected by communal disputes in the Middle Belt.
A policing system that understands local languages, terrain, relationships and criminal networks could improve intelligence gathering and response times. State governments would also be better placed to identify local security priorities and coordinate responses to problems that may receive insufficient attention under a highly centralised arrangement.
Governors have long complained that citizens hold them responsible for insecurity while they lack direct operational control over the police commands in their states. There is some force in that argument. A governor who is expected to answer questions about the safety of residents should have an effective means of contributing to the security of those residents.
But responsibility without control is only one side of the problem. The other is control without accountability.
A governor is not a neutral administrator standing outside politics. He belongs to a political party, has political allies and opponents, and may be interested in securing the election of a preferred successor. If a state police structure becomes too dependent on the governor for appointments, promotions, discipline, funding or operational direction, the distinction between public security and partisan interest could become dangerously blurred.
Consider what could happen when an election approaches. An opposition party announces a rally in a town where the ruling party fears losing support. An opposition candidate plans to visit a community to discuss unemployment, abandoned projects or allegations of poor governance. Young people organise a peaceful protest against government policy. In each instance, the police should protect lawful activity and enforce the law impartially.
But what happens if the officers believe their careers depend on pleasing the governor? Could a lawful political meeting be subjected to unnecessary restrictions? Could police powers be used selectively against opposition organisers while supporters of the ruling party enjoy greater freedom? Could citizens become afraid to express political preferences because they fear the consequences?
These are risks that Nigeria cannot afford to dismiss as hypothetical inconveniences. They go to the heart of democratic competition. The danger is particularly serious as the country approaches the 2027 general elections. Establishing a new police structure involves recruitment, training, funding, command arrangements, jurisdictional rules and mechanisms for investigating misconduct. These are not matters that should be hurried through simply to demonstrate political determination. A poorly prepared transition could create confusion among security agencies at the very time Nigerians need impartial and coordinated policing.
There is a strong argument, therefore, for completing the legal and institutional groundwork now while deferring the operational deployment of state police until after the 2027 general elections. Such a transition should be carefully planned, consistent with the law and without weakening existing security operations. The objective would not be to abandon reform but to prevent a major change in the control of armed law-enforcement institutions from becoming entangled in an imminent electoral contest.
This concern has already entered the national debate. In June 2026, Peter Obi called for the implementation of state police to be deferred until after the 2027 elections, citing concerns about political manipulation and the need for independent oversight. Omoyele Sowore made a similar call in August. Their positions reflect a broader question that deserves consideration beyond party politics: can Nigeria establish a new policing structure without creating doubts about electoral fairness? It would, however, be misleading to suggest that the existing federal police structure is immune to political interference. Allegations of partisan policing have arisen under the present arrangement as well. Centralisation does not automatically guarantee neutrality, just as decentralisation does not automatically guarantee accountability. The real challenge is to design institutions in which abuse is difficult to commit, easy to detect and subject to meaningful punishment.
The proposed safeguards must therefore go beyond assurances from governors. State Police Service Commissions need genuine independence in recruitment, promotion and discipline. Police commanders should not be removable at the personal whim of a governor. Complaints against officers must be investigated by bodies capable of acting without political interference. The law should provide clear sanctions for using police personnel to intimidate political opponents, journalists, peaceful protesters or ordinary citizens.
Funding also requires careful attention. If a governor can starve a police command of resources because its leadership refuses to do his political bidding, financial control becomes another instrument of coercion. A transparent funding arrangement, independent auditing and enforceable national standards are essential. The division of responsibilities between federal and state police must also be clear, particularly where crimes cross state boundaries or involve organised criminal networks.
There is an additional danger in a federation as diverse as Nigeria. State police must not become an instrument for excluding people regarded as outsiders or for settling ethnic, religious and communal disputes through partisan enforcement. Every resident must enjoy equal protection under the law. A police officer’s first loyalty must be to the Constitution and the law, not to a governor, a political party or a particular community. Ultimately, the test of state police will not be the number of commands established or the number of officers recruited. It will be whether citizens are safer, criminal investigations improve, public confidence grows and political opponents can exercise their rights without fear.
Nigeria needs security reform. What it must avoid is a reform that solves one problem while creating another, potentially more dangerous one. Governors should have the means to improve security in their states, but they must never be allowed to treat the police as an extension of their political organisations. A democracy cannot function properly when the same government that contests an election can use an inadequately controlled security institution to influence the conditions under which that contest takes place. State police may bring law enforcement closer to the people. The country must ensure that it does not also bring political intimidation closer to their doorsteps. The purpose of state police should be to protect the people of each state, not to protect those who govern them from the people they govern.
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