Dr. Princewill Osuchukwu
On 20 October, Nigeria confirmed its first case of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease, an imported infection diagnosed at a private hospital in Abuja. Public-health authorities moved quickly to identify and monitor contacts, and the World Health Organization was right to caution that one imported case does not amount to an outbreak. For anyone who runs a mine, a factory or a construction site, however, the case should prompt a sharper question than whether the virus will spread. If an official health alert landed on your desk tomorrow morning, would it set a rehearsed response in motion, or begin a meeting to decide who is in charge?
Hospitals carry the clinical burden of an epidemic. The economic and social burden is carried wherever people must still gather to work. Every industrial operation in Nigeria will face the same decisions in the next emergency: which activities can continue safely, which must change and when work should stop. Those choices shape transmission and livelihoods at the same time, and they cannot be made well for the first time under pressure.
I learned this building a gold mine through COVID-19. At Segilola Resources Operating Limited, Nigeria’s first legal large-scale gold mine, we began contingency planning with our engineering, procurement and construction contractor, Norinco, in January 2020, when Wuhan still looked a long way from Osun State. Construction continued through the pandemic and the mine poured its first gold on 30 July 2021. That milestone is not a claim that we escaped disruption. We recorded COVID-19 cases on site, which required isolation and tighter controls, and commissioning was delayed, chiefly by global supply-chain disruptions. The lasting lesson was less about avoiding shocks than about how an organisation adjusts when its assumptions meet reality.
Rules are not habits
Our hardest problem was not procurement or logistics. It was persuading people to keep doing a simple thing every day. Workers would put on masks at the gate and remove them once the supervisor moved on. A rule had been issued, but a habit had not been formed. What changed behaviour was explaining the purpose in terms people recognised: the measures existed so that everyone went home safely at the end of the shift, to families who depended on them. A precaution tied to a colleague’s health or a child at home carried a weight that an instruction alone never did.
For leaders, the point is that repeated lapses are information. They signal that an instruction is not understood, not practical or not modelled by the supervisors who enforce it. Workers need a way to say what makes compliance difficult, because a procedure can be technically sound and still fail on an ordinary shift if its authors never hear how it works there.
Trust is tested again at the moment a worker feels unwell. Asking for early disclosure is easy; making it rational is harder. If declaring symptoms means lost wages, a contract that is not renewed or a reputation for being difficult, people will stay quiet, and no awareness campaign will change that calculation. This bites hardest for contractors and casual workers, who often sit outside most employer’s sick-pay arrangements yet work alongside permanent staff every day. Preparedness therefore reaches into pay policy and contractor terms. If the incentives punish honesty, the health plan will fail at the point it matters most.
Ebola is not COVID-19
The next emergency will also expose the limits of past experience. WHO identifies direct contact with the blood or body fluids of an infected person, and with contaminated materials, as the routes of Ebola transmission, and there is no licensed vaccine for the Bundibugyo strain. The controls that matter are therefore different: how site clinics and first-aiders handle a sick colleague, how soiled materials and clinical waste are managed, and how a suspected case is isolated and referred. A company that retrieves its COVID-19 handbook and calls it an Ebola plan is underprepared. It needs qualified medical advice, an established line to the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention and state health authorities, and the discipline to revise controls as evidence changes.
But effective surveillance must begin well before a suspected case reaches the clinic. Workers across every service unit need accurate, practical information about the symptoms to recognize, the risks associated with exposure and the procedures for reporting concerns. That knowledge should extend beyond the workplace. An informed worker is better equipped to recognize warning signs at home, encourage family members to seek timely medical advice and take appropriate precautions to reduce the risk of infection in the community and its subsequent introduction to the site.
Within the workplace, employees become an important first line of surveillance, helping to identify and report potential cases early rather than relying exclusively on formal medical screening. Equally important is the vigilance of site medical personnel, who must maintain a high index of suspicion and know when to escalate a potential case for further assessment. Early detection depends on both: a workforce equipped to recognizes and report warnings signs, and a clinical team prepared to act on them.
Decide who decides
Early preparation should create room for decisions rather than pretend to predict every event. Before any alert, management should settle who has authority to restrict site access, change shift patterns or suspend an activity, and what evidence will trigger each step. The plan should also define a minimum safe operation: the smallest competent team that can keep critical processes under control if key people fall ill or cannot travel. On a mine, water management, tailings and security do not pause because production does. A production target cannot answer whether there are enough competent people on site to run a process responsibly. Only a plan made in advance can.
The most valuable innovation in a crisis is often organisational. Which specialist advice can be delivered remotely? Which critical roles depend on a single person? Which inputs depend on a single supplier or a single route? Each answer carries a cost. Extra stock ties up capital, a second supplier needs technical qualification and cross-training takes people away from productive work. Working through those trade-offs in calm conditions buys options that cannot be created once roads, borders or rosters are disrupted.
Plans then need to be tested against uncomfortable scenarios. Imagine several essential workers are unavailable, a critical delivery is stuck and a rumour is circulating in the host community. Who decides? How does accurate information reach contractors, families and community leaders, and how quickly? The value of such an exercise lies in finding unanswered questions while there is still time to answer them. Boards should ask to see that work with the same seriousness they bring to financial and operational reporting.
Responsibility is shared. Public-health authorities lead surveillance, testing and clinical guidance; employers determine whether that guidance reaches the people and decisions inside their gates. Nigeria’s containment of Ebola in 2014 showed what rapid tracing and coordination can achieve, and industry should be a reliable partner in that system rather than a gap in it. Relationships between companies, local health services and regulators work best when they are built before they are needed. A mine’s fence does not separate the health of its workforce from the health of the communities where those workers live, shop and worship.
The questions investors should ask
For Nigeria, industrial ambition should include the capacity to manage a health emergency without an improvised choice between unsafe work and an unmanaged shutdown. Investors, lenders and policymakers can test that capacity with a few direct questions. Who has authority to act on an official alert? What does a minimum safe operation look like? Can a contract worker report symptoms without losing income? How will information reach the host community? Are workers equipped to recognize and report potential cases, and are site medical teams prepared to identify and escalate them? An operator that cannot answer them has a gap in its risk profile, whatever its production forecast says.
Segilola’s experience is a case for starting early and for continuing to learn once a plan exists. Preparing for a distant threat mattered. So did the patient, daily work of explaining why a simple precaution deserved to be taken seriously. Every industrial leader in Nigeria should be able to explain, today, how their organisation will act on a health warning and how its people will be supported through the response. Telling workers that everyone goes home safely is a promise. Preparedness is the operating plan that keeps it.
Dr. Princewill Osuchukwu, Medical Services Manager, Segilola Resources Operating Limited (SROL)

