Freddie Grounds
Somalia’s fight against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia is increasingly drawing military support from foreign countries, with troop deployments, airstrikes, training and defence partnerships becoming important parts of the country’s security operations.
Recent military activities in the Lower Shabelle region, alongside increased United States airstrikes, point to a growing pattern of international involvement in Somalia’s campaign against insurgent groups.
In March 2026, Somali National Army forces, supported by the Ugandan contingent of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and other international partners, announced the recapture of Mubarak and Daarusalaam in Lower Shabelle.
Further operations in April targeted additional insurgent positions, with AUSSOM reporting air support and coordinated ground operations.
The developments highlight how Somalia’s military campaign is increasingly dependent on cooperation between its national forces, African Union troops and foreign military partners.
The United States remains one of the country’s major international security partners, particularly through its counterterrorism air campaign.
On October 17, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed an airstrike targeting Al-Shabaab near Dhooble Airport in southern Somalia.
AFRICOM’s published register recorded 88 airstrikes in Somalia during 2026 at the time of writing, targeting both Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia.
The sustained air campaign reflects Washington’s continued involvement in efforts to weaken insurgent groups and support Somalia’s security operations. However, the figures do not establish that US aircraft directly supported every successful ground operation.
Türkiye has also expanded its military relationship with Somalia through defence cooperation, training and the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft, publicly demonstrated in April 2026.
Although the deployment demonstrates Ankara’s growing military engagement, there is no established evidence that Turkish combat aircraft participated in the specific operations in Lower Shabelle. Beyond air power and military training, foreign troop deployments are becoming another significant feature of Somalia’s security strategy.
According to The EastAfrican, Uganda is estimated to have between 4,000 and 6,000 troops deployed in Somalia under bilateral arrangements, in addition to its approximately 4,500 personnel allocated to AUSSOM. Ethiopia is also reported to have about 5,000 bilateral troops in the country, alongside its 2,500-person allocation to the African Union mission.
These figures are estimates rather than independently verified troop totals. The growing presence of these forces raises an important distinction between bilateral military arrangements and the African Union’s multilateral security framework.
AUSSOM provides an organised platform for African countries to contribute troops towards stabilisation and the strengthening of Somali security institutions. Bilateral deployments, on the other hand, operate through direct agreements between individual countries and the Somali government. While they may complement the AU mission, their command structures, operational priorities and support arrangements are not necessarily identical.
This growing approach has been described as the ‘bilateralisation’ of the war against Al-Shabaab, reflecting the increasing role of individual countries in providing troops and direct military assistance outside the formal AU framework. International involvement also extends beyond conventional military forces.
Photographs published by The EastAfrican following operations in Lower Shabelle showed Somali and Ugandan troops alongside personnel from Bancroft Global Development, a contractor involved in training and mentoring Somali forces. The presence of the organisation illustrates how specialist military support is increasingly positioned close to frontline operations, although it does not establish that its personnel participated in combat.
There are clear operational reasons behind Somalia’s growing reliance on foreign military partners. Additional troops can provide manpower for operations, while airstrikes can weaken insurgent positions and create opportunities for ground forces to advance. Intelligence sharing, military training and logistical assistance can also strengthen the capabilities of Somali forces.
However, the involvement of several international partners presents coordination challenges. Different countries may operate under separate agreements, with varying command arrangements, operational priorities and support structures. Their presence does not automatically establish a unified military command or prove that all operations are jointly planned. There is also the question of how long Somalia can sustain its security campaign with significant external military assistance.
Reclaiming territory from insurgents is only one part of the challenge. Maintaining control requires secure supply routes, capable Somali security personnel, functioning local administration and public confidence in government institutions. Without these, insurgent groups may exploit security gaps and attempt to return to previously recovered communities.
The future of AUSSOM is therefore central to discussions about Somalia’s security arrangements. Its authorised strength should be distinguished from the number of troops actually deployed and available for operations. Egypt’s participation was already being prepared in February 2026, while any further expansion of the mission should be assessed against confirmed decisions rather than reported proposals. Ultimately, Somalia’s growing military partnerships reflect the scale of the security challenge confronting the country.
Foreign troops, US airstrikes, Turkish defence cooperation and African Union operations are providing additional support to the Somali government in its campaign against Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. But the bigger question is whether these partnerships can help Somalia develop the military capacity and institutions needed to secure its territory independently.
The experience of 2026 shows that foreign forces are playing an increasingly important role in Somalia’s fight against insurgency. The lasting success of that involvement, however, will depend not simply on the number of troops deployed or airstrikes conducted, but on whether the support translates into sustainable security for the country.
* Lieutenant Colonel Grounds (rtd) writes from Kenya