Postscript by Waziri Adio
Nigeria’s next presidential election is now less than six months away. The campaigns, according to the timetable set by the election management body, will not start officially until exactly a month from today. But how the 2027 presidential campaigns will be prosecuted is already visible. Also becoming visible are the assumptions and the calculations that the leading presidential candidates hope will grant them victory. However, there can be only one winner. Here, I will explore and interrogate what I sense are the current strategies of the top three presidential candidates.
Before we go into that, I want to address three points. The first is that the fact that we have ended up again with the same cast of frontrunners as we did in the last electoral cycle does not necessarily mean the outcomes for 2023 and 2027 will be the same. They may or may not be. The 2027 presidential contest may or may not be as keen as that of 2023, which is on record for being our most competitive presidential election since 1999 but had a parallel in our first presidential election of 1979.
To start with, the contexts for 2023 and 2027 are slightly different. The 2023 poll was an open election because there was no incumbent candidate on the ballot (though there was an incumbent party, which did not wholeheartedly support its own candidate). In 2027, there will be an incumbent candidate, which is both an advantage and a burden, but still a difference worth highlighting, a point we will explore further shortly. There are also other shifts in the political and larger societal environment which may shape how voters decide, with implications for the electoral fortunes of the different candidates. It is thus a non-sequitur that we are necessarily back at 2023 simply because of a similarity in line-ups.
The second point is that the failure of the opposition to present a united front against an incumbent is not necessarily fatal. Yes, a major lesson from 2015 is that a united and formidable opposition is the surest path to upstaging an incumbent president in Nigeria. But the predictable fracturing of the opposition does not mean that 2027 is a foregone conclusion. This is the same way that having a united opposition does not automatically mean the incumbent is gone. Either way, there is still a lot to play for, as a lot can still be determined on the margins.
The third point is that all the leading candidates are united on the point of strategy. Even if they don’t acknowledge it, they are all trying to do the same thing: assemble a winning coalition that can meet the two conditions for victory in our electoral system—scoring the highest number of valid votes and meeting the spread requirement. There are different paths (either directly to the voters or indirectly through the political brokers), but the tactics appear the same. At the end of the day, it is this ability to wangle that winning coalition in a country with different blocs and types of voters that will separate the eventual winner from the pack.
Let’s start the review of the 2027 permutations with Mr. Peter Obi, the revelation of the 2023 electoral cycle and currently the presidential candidate of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC). Flying the flag of the Labour Party (LP), Mr. Obi came third with 6.1 million votes, representing 25% of total votes cast in 2023. This was a record for a third-party presidential candidate in Nigeria in terms of a combination of the absolute number and percentage of votes polled. In the current republic, that record previously belonged to Alhaji Atiku Abubabakar, then of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), who came third with 2.64 million votes and 7.5% of votes cast in the controversial 2007 election. In the 1979 election, our most competitive presidential poll till date, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) scored 2.8 million votes and 17% of the votes (though he actually got higher votes but a lower proportion in the controversial election of 1983—3.6 million votes amounting to 14% of the total votes).
As brilliant infographics from The Cable show, Obi in 2023 broke the record set by Azikiwe and Atiku with a stunning performance that saw him come first in two geo-political zones (South East, 90% and South South, 44%) and a close second in another zone (North Central, 33%). Remarkably, he got the highest votes in Lagos (the political base of Mr. Bola Tinubu, the eventual winner of the election) and Obi blew everyone else out of the water with 61% of the votes in FCT. He was also the only presidential candidate in the 2023 electoral cycle to go above the 80% mark in four states (Ebonyi, 80%; Abia, 88%; Enugu, 94%; and Anambra, 95%).
Only Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the United Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Dr. Azikiwe posted such percentages in their home base back in 1979 (Zik got 83% in old Anambra and 85% in old Imo while Awo polled 82% in Lagos, 86% in old Oyo, 92% in Ogun and 95% in Ondo). (Interesting to note that President Olusegun Obasanjo got above 80% in five states in 1999, but the states—Akwa Ibom, Katsina, Niger, Rivers and Taraba— were not from his home base and he went on to win the election unlike Azikiwe and Awolowo). Obi’s 2023 performance is clearly historic but he fell short in the core north, just as Awo and Zik before him. Obi had almost a no-show in the vote-rich North West (where he got only 5% of 6.5 million votes) and was still non-competitive in the North East (where he received 10% of 3.1 million votes), and met the spread requirement in only FCT and 15 of the 36 states (which is nine states below the 24 required).
In 2027, Obi hopes to turn the electoral arithmetic in his favour by maintaining or surpassing his record in the South (where he got 45% of 9 million votes) and by making better inroads into the North (where he got just 15% of 13.7 million votes). To start with, a lot too will depend on what has happened to the stellar support that Obi garnered in 2023. Has it remained intact, grown or fallen? Whatever has happened, he still needs a better showing in the North. This is where his current running-mate Dr. Rabiu Kwankwaso looks like an inspired signing. Kwankwaso, another politician with near-cultic following, came fourth in the 2023 presidential elections with 6% of the total votes, another record in this republic (the candidate that came last in 1979, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim of GNPP, scored 10% of the total votes) The NDC ticket looks tasty as a combination of two movements with real electoral value, the Obidient Movement and the Kwankwasiyya Movement, now fused into the equally appealing OK Movement.
Kwankwaso is clearly a major upgrade on Obi’s running mate in 2023, Senator Datti Baba-Ahmed. Kwankwaso has a proper political structure that is expected to bring votes beyond his Kano base. It is also expected that the ticket will be greater than the sum of its parts, as a combination of the 7.5 million votes or 31% polled by Obi and Kwankwaso in 2023 when both of them were presidential candidates would still have fallen short of the binding requirements for electoral victory. It is conceivable that the votes for Kwankwaso as a candidate might not all be transferable to the ticket on which he is a running mate.
Another likely hurdle for the OK ticket is the political consensus about power rotation between the North and the South. In response to this consensus, Obi has pledged to do only one term if elected president. It is doubtful many northern voters believe him, precisely because everyone knows it would be difficult to stop an incumbent president from availing himself of a constitutional right. So, that northern bridgehead may or may not materialise for Obi.
Atiku will also confront this consensus that supports power being in the South for another four years. He tested that consensus in 2023 after President Muhammadu Buhari, a fellow Northerner, had just completed two terms of eight years, and he almost succeeded. He came second with 6.9 million votes or 29% of total votes cast. He achieved this by scoring the highest votes in the North East (56%) and coming second in the North West (34%) and the South West (22%). Interestingly, Atiku also came second overall in the North where he polled 35% of 13.7 million votes but fell short in the South where he scored 19% of 9 million votes.
Atiku’s strong showing in 2023 when the sentiment (even among prominent Northern politicians) was for the presidency to move to the South seems to suggest that power rotation might not be as important to the voters as the politicians think or that there are instances when voters are ready to waive it or when they are more motivated by other factors such as identity and things going on in their lives. Atiku tested this assumption before and will test it again. Ordinarily, the fracturing of the opposition should have deterred Atiku or dampened his interest. He came short in 2023 precisely because Obi took away the South East and the South South which had been steady strongholds of his then party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), for six electoral cycles. In 2023, Atiku got 26% in the South South and 4% in the South East, compared to Obi’s 44% and 90% respectively. All things being equal, getting Atiku and Obi to join forces would have burnished Atiku’s chances at the head of the ticket in 2027.
But Atiku still sees a viable pathway. A major pillar of his strategy appears to be to lock down the vote-rich North as the main presidential contender from a region that is feeling marginalised by the sectional nature of Tinubu’s political appointments, that is affected the most by the harsh effects of economic reforms, and that is in search of a new leader after the passing of Buhari. If “your own is your own” worked wonders in 2023, there is a chance it will be more than handy in 2027.
The second major strand of Atiku’s permutation appears to build on the first: a field of strong candidates from the South advantages the dominant candidate from the North. His hope is that while he wins handsomely in the North, southern votes will be split by Tinubu and Obi (and maybe Mr. Seyi Makinde, the governor of Oyo State running for president on the platform of the Allied Peoples Movement, APM). A combination of these two factors is expected to grant Atiku the highest number of votes. The third strand of Atiku’s strategy is for him to meet the spread requirement by getting at least 25% in some southern states through his allies and networks in the south, his national name recognition and the standing of his running mate, Mr. Rotimi Amaechi. Plan A appears to be to win on the first ballot while Plan B is to be on the ballot in case of a run-off.
This appears like a solid permutation. But Atiku also has his hurdles. The consensus on power rotation is one. Also, the electoral value of his running mate is doubtful. It is also not clear the extent to which he has the North on a lockdown even with all the things going on or whether anyone has yet or will ever inherit Buhari’s following. The three zones in North have hardly voted in one direction whether in this republic or in previous ones. The candidates running for down ballot in the other parties and Atiku do not have a unified interest. There is also a possibility that northern voters and leaders would rather negotiate for better terms and wait for 2031 when they will be certain power can stay in their region for two terms.
In this same category may fall younger politicians from the North who fancy their chances to be president in four years when they would be competing against their peers or would have good reasons not to defer to an 84-year-old. Also, it is doubtful that Atiku’s current party, the African Democratic Congress (ADC), has the nationwide structure to successfully prosecute a presidential election. Without a doubt, ADC boasts of prominent politicians, but it is not as structurally rooted as the All Progressives Congress (APC) was when it took on and successfully upstaged an incumbent party and candidate in 2015.
The presidential candidate that is assured of the most formidable electoral structure today is President Tinubu, the incumbent. APC, his party, has governors in 31 or 86% of 36 states. APC controls the most dominant political and state machineries in all the 19 states in the North except Bauchi State and in all the 17 states in the South except Abia, Anambra, Osun and Oyo states. Two of the remaining five governors would have been in APC if the negotiations had gone well and two other governors have clear sympathies for or have chummy relationship with the president. The role of governors and the structures they control in electoral outcome cannot be dismissed lightly, irrespective of the opposition spin of the election being between the people and the governors. This however does not mean Tinubu would win in or even secure 25% in all the states with APC governors. Nor does it suggest that all the governors who decamped to APC did so because they are in love with the president or will actively work for him or that there is much that they can do to steer hostile local sentiments in Tinubu’s favour.
Tinubu was able to narrowly get over the line in 2023 because he cobbled together a coalition that aligned with the dynamics of that electoral cycle and the elementary reality of our electoral politics that a winning candidate must secure significant votes across regional lines. Tinubu got 8.8 million votes or 37% of total votes cast, the lowest winning margin secured in the Fourth Republic but comparable to Alhaji Shehu Shagari’s 34% in the highly competitive election of 1979. Tinubu did not poll up to 70% in any state (the closest was 67% in Ondo) but he stayed competitive by coming second in states or zones where he did not lead and by getting the highest number of votes in the South West, North Central and even the North West (where he led in only two of the seven states). He actually lost in two of the six states in his home zone, the South West (Osun and Lagos), the only one of the top three with such a record (Obi won all five states in the South East and Atiku led in five of the six states in the North East). But overall, Tinubu secured 39% of the 13.7 million votes in the North and 36% of the 9 million votes in the South, and met the spread requirement in 30 states.
With a fractured opposition and a dominant APC, Tinubu’s permutation appears to be to surpass or at least maintain what he achieved in 2023 by improving on his performance, to varying degrees, in the three zones in the South, aiming for a plurality of votes in the North Central and for being competitive in both the North West and the North East. The unwritten rule about power rotation favours him, as he is the only southern candidate that is term-barred from running again if he wins in 2027 (it can safely be said that President Goodluck Jonathan’s undenied bid has ended). Incumbency is also expected to enhance Tinubu’s chances. Deep pockets, especially the business oligarchs, are likely to contribute more to his campaign than to others, and money makes a lot of difference in our elections. He is also in a position where he was not in 2023. He is now in control of state instruments and resources, and it is difficult to think that he would not press them to maximum advantage.
However, incumbency is double-edged. Re-elections are always referendums on incumbents. And this particular incumbent has a lot to be vulnerable for. Tinubu has alienated many of those who supported him in 2023, especially some northerners with electoral value and he has been framed as anti-North. He has been flagrantly sectional in his appointments and his administration has been given to avoidable own-goals and is difficult to sell overall as stellar. But most critically, his signature economic reforms on petrol subsidy removal and Naira devaluation, necessary and transformative as they are, have inflicted the most devastating hardship in decades on most Nigerians, especially the most vulnerable. People are wired to remember pains, especially lingering ones, and on the basis of this the opposition seems convinced that Nigerians can never re-elect Tinubu and that the only way he can win is by rigging. This is also not necessarily so. Voters mostly choose from the options available to them and are sometimes decided by different factors. Despite all that is going on, Tinubu’s strategy may still hold up in 2027, but it may also fall short.
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